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Abstract
In this paper, we empirically examine the link between local taxes and education choice. Due
to the endogenous relationship, 2SLS estimation is applied to correct for simultaneous
equations bias. A total of 500 school districts in the state of Pennsylvania during the school
years 1999-2000 to 2001-2002 are selected for a case study. Results indicate that local taxes
per student are positively associated with private school enrollment rates, implying that
increases in these enrollments greatly benefit public schools through tax support.
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I. Introduction
In 2006, Lin and Quayes investigated how education inputs affect student performance. They 
found that local taxes are significantly related to student performance, implying that local taxes 
are one of the important education inputs. Since local taxes are the primary source of funds for 
public school districts and as such significantly determine the quality of public schools, local 
taxes  may  impact  parents’  choice  of  education.  In  addition,  local  taxes  are  set  by  local 
governments, which in turn are elected by local inhabitants. Parents who choose to enroll their 
children in private schools may be less willing to pay taxes to finance public schools. Thus, both 
local taxes and educational choice depend on parents’ preference, implying that the amount of 
local taxes  per  public  school  pupil and  parental  choice  of  education  are  jointly  determined. 
Therefore, in this paper, we attempt to develop an empirical model and test the hypothesis (i.e., 
local taxes may impact parental choice of education), which is the primary contribution made 
through this paper. 
This article is organized as follows. First, we develop a simultaneous-equation framework 
and  describe  data  measurement.  Second, we  present  empirical  results.  Finally,  concluding 
remarks are offered.     
II. Empirical Models and Data Measurement
Due to the endogenous relationship, local taxes per student and parental choice of education 
are jointly determined simultaneously. Thus, a simple simultaneous-equation model is specified 
as follows:
Parental choice of education = f (Poverty, Local taxes per student, Teacher salary, 
Teacher quality, Ethnicity, Student Performance
Urbanization, Quality of public school, Religious
belief), 
and
Local taxes per student = f (Poverty, Parental choice of education, Ethnicity,  
Urbanization, Quality of public school).
We used panel data. A total of 500 school districts in the state of Pennsylvania were selected for 
a case study, emphasizing school years 1999-2000 to 2001-2002. The data can be found on the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education website. 
The proxy for parents’ choice of education is K-12 private school enrollment rates, because 
parents  can  choose  either  public  or  private  school  for  their  children.  The  private  school 
enrollment rates are defined as the number of students enrolled in private schools divided by the 
sum of the number of students enrolled in private and public schools. The proportion of public 
school  enrollments  from  low-income  families  can  be  a  proxy  for  poverty.  This  variable  is 
defined as the number of enrollments from low-income families divided by the number of total 
enrollments.
Teacher salary is the primary factor affecting a school district’s probability of hiring a highly 
qualified teacher. This variable is measured as the average annual salaries for full-time public 
school teachers. Teacher quality is positively related to his/her educational level and teaching 
experiences. It is measured as the average educational level of full-time teachers multiplied by 
the average total years of teaching (i.e., AEY = E x Y, where AEY = average quality of teachers, E2
= average educational level of full-time teachers, and Y = average total years of teaching) (See 
Note 1).
Ethnicity is one of the important factors in many parents’ selection of private education for 
their children. Two proxies were selected for the variable of ethnicity: the proportion of African-
American enrollments  in public  schools  (i.e., total African-American enrollments divided  by 
total enrollments in public schools); and the proportion of minority enrollments except African-
American in public schools (i.e., total minority enrollments except African-American divided by 
total enrollments). It should be noted that minority students include American Indian/Alaskan 
Native, Asian/Pacific Islander, African-American, and Hispanic.
Three proxies are used to identify student performance in public schools. The first proxy is 
measured as public secondary school dropout rates. The second proxy is measured as the growth 
rate for the proportion of public high school graduates enrolled in 2- or 4-year colleges and 
universities. The growth rate of postsecondary education rates is used rather than postsecondary 
education rates because a high or low rate of postsecondary education cannot be said to precisely
affect parents’ choice of public or private education – parents may compare the rate with that for 
private schools. For example, we may think that a 65% enrollment rate among public high school 
graduates enrolled in 2- or 4-year colleges and universities is high, but the rate for private high 
school graduates enrolled in 2- or 4-year colleges and universities is 86%. A comparison of these 
two rates reveals that many high-income parents may choose private school for their children.
What we need is a relative rate rather than an absolute rate. Unfortunately, no school district-
level data are available for the proportion of private high school graduates enrolled in 2- or 4-
year colleges and universities. Here, we use the growth rates for postsecondary education rates as 
a proxy because they can show improvement in student performance in public schools. The third 
proxy is the growth rate of SAT scores. The reason for using the growth rate for those scores is 
the same as that for using the growth rate of postsecondary education rates. 
Student-teacher ratio in public schools can be a proxy for public school quality. This variable 
is defined as total enrollments in public schools divided by total number of teachers in public 
schools. The higher the ratio is, the lower the school quality will be.
Local taxes include real estate tax (see Note 2), earned income/net profits tax (see Note 3), 
and  a  mixture  of  other  non-property  taxes  (occupational  privilege,  amusement,  per  capita, 
mercantile, business privilege, and mechanical devices). Local taxes are the primary source of 
local revenues for school districts. In other words, higher local tax revenues would lead to a 
higher quality of public schools because schools would have more funds to use in improving 
facilities and equipment. Local taxes per student are defined as total local tax revenues divided 
by total enrollments in public schools.
Urbanization is measured according to codes. These codes are: 1 = school district located in 
Rural, inside Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA); 2 = school district located in Rural, outside 
CBSA; 3 = school district located in Small Town; 4 = school district located in Large Town; 5 = 
school district located in Urban Fringe of a Mid-size City; 6 = school district located in Urban 
Fringe of a Large City; 7 = school district  located in Mid-size City; and 8 = school district 
located in Large City (see Note 4). 
Religious belief is also one of the important factors in many parents’ selection of private 
education for their children. Religious beliefs are measured by the total number of adherents who 
are members of a church divided by the total number of residents. The number of adherents can 
be found in the American Religion Data Archive. 3
Based  upon  the  simple  simultaneous-equation  model,  we  can  develop  the  following 
regression models:
PER a a PLI a ATS a AEY a PBS a PMS a PSD a STR a LTX it it it it it it it it it          0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
     a URB a GPH a GSA a RLP it it it it t 9 10 11 12 1  ,                                                          (1.1)
PER PLI ATS AEY PBS PMS PSD a STR it it it it it it it it                0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 log
            8 9 10 11 12 2 log LTX URB GPH GSA RLP it it it it it t ,                                 (1.2)
LTX b b PER b PLI b STR b PBS b PMS b PSD b URB it it it it it it it it t          0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 3  ,           (2.1)
log LTX PER PLI STR PBS PMS PSD URB it it it it it it it it t                   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 4 , (2.2)
where i = 1, 2, 3,…, 500; t = 1999 – 2000, 2000 – 2001, 2001 – 2002; PER = private school 
enrollment rates; PLI = proportion of low-income families in public schools; ATS = average full-
time teacher salaries in public schools; AEY = average education level of full-time teachers in 
public schools multiplied by average number of years teaching; PBS = proportion of African-
American students; PMS = proportion of minority students except African-American; PSD = 
proportion of public secondary school dropouts; STR = student–teacher ratio in public schools; 
LTX = local taxes per student; URB = urbanization; GPH = growth rate of proportion of public 
high school graduates enrolled in 2- or 4-year colleges and universities; GSA = growth rate of 
SAT scores in public schools; RLP = the ratio of religious population to total resident population; 
and  = stochastic disturbance (with a mean 0 and a variance
2).
III. Empirical Results
To correct for simultaneous equations bias, the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) procedure 
is used to obtain unique estimates that are consistent and asymptotically efficient.
Determinants of Private School Enrollment Rates
The results from the 2SLS estimations are reported in Table 1. In columns (4) – (6), both 
average full-time teacher salaries and local taxes per student have been converted to log values. 
As columns (1) and (4) show, proportion of low-income families in public schools provides a 
negative and significant effect at the 10% level in Model 1 (Equation (1.1)) and 5% level in
Model 2 (Equation (1.2)) on private school enrollment rates. This result implies that the higher 
level of poverty slows down the local economy, meaning that more middle-income families who 
initially chose private school may move into the public sector because they are less able to afford 
the costs of private education.
In columns (1) and (4), average full-time teacher salary in public schools provides a negative 
and significant effect at the 1% level in both models on private school enrollment rates. The
result implies that higher teacher salaries would offer more confidence for parents of middle- and 
high-income families because they may believe that a higher teacher salary provides a greater 
incentive  for  teachers  to  spend  more  time  assisting  students  and  thereby  improve  student 
performance.  In addition,  the  possibility of a  higher  teacher  salary  would result  in  a  higher 
possibility of hiring a highly qualified teacher (Figlio, 1997).4
Public school teacher quality, identified by AEY, exerts a positive and significant effect at the 
10% level, as shown in column (1), on private school enrollment rates, but the effect is not 
significant at the 10% level, as shown in column (4). This variable initially was expected to exert 
a negative effect on private school enrollment rates because the availability of higher-quality 
teachers leads high- or middle-income families to send their children to public schools. However, 
this variable exerts a positive effect. One possible reason is that public school teacher quality is 
positively associated with private school teacher quality, implying that when the public school 
teacher quality is enhanced, private school teacher quality is also enhanced – perhaps even more 
so. 
The proportion of African-American enrollments does not exert a significant effect on private 
school enrollment rates in both columns (1) and (4). Nevertheless, the proportion of minority 
enrollments except African-American exerts a positive and significant effect at the 1% level in 
both columns (1) and (4) on private school enrollment rates. The result might imply that the 
higher the proportion of non-white kids in public schools, the more likely it is that white families 
may send their children to private schools.
The proportion of public secondary school dropouts provides a positive and significant effect 
at the 1% level on private school enrollment rates, as shown in both columns (1) and (4). The 
result implies that the larger the number of kids who drop out from public schools, the greater the 
number of high- and/or middle-income families who prefer to choose private school for their 
children, because dropout rates in public schools reflect the public school performance. Thus, a 
higher dropout rate indicates a lower public school performance.
As expected, student-teacher ratio provides a positive and significant effect at the 1% level
on private school enrollment rates, as shown in both columns (1) and (4), implying that the 
higher the ratio  the  lower  the public  school quality. Thus,  more  families  may  switch to the 
private sector.
Local taxes per student exerts a positive and significant effect on private school enrollment 
rates at the 1% level, as shown in both columns (1) and (4), which means that higher local taxes 
per student may lead to a higher proportion of private school enrollments. It should be noted that
local taxes per pupil and private school enrollment rates indeed can be positively or negatively 
related. The effect is positive implying three possible explanations: first, more students enrolled 
in private schools, holding revenue constant, each student in public schools can receive more tax 
support; second, as offered by Erekson (1982), high-quality private schools may be located in the 
same school districts as high-quality public schools; third, high-income  families  may always 
have some preconception that the quality of private schools must be better than the quality of 
public schools, so that in the event of average income increases, more people move into the
private sector. The estimated coefficient of local taxes per student is 0.00418  in column (1), 
indicating that for each additional dollar spent on each student from local taxes, there will be an 
estimated increase in the private school enrollment rate of approximately 0.00418%.
Urbanization  exhibits  a  positive  and  significant  effect  at  the  1%  level  on  private  school 
enrollment rates in both columns (1) and (4), implying that the more urbanized a school district 
is, the more likely it is that families will prefer to choose private education for their children. 
The growth rates for postsecondary education rates provide a negative and significant effect 
on private school enrollment rates at the 5% level in column (1) and 10% level in column (4), 
respectively. However, the growth rates for SAT scores exert a negative but insignificant effect 
on private school enrollment rates, as shown in both columns (1) and (4). These results imply 5
that  improved  student  achievement  in  public  schools  may  enhance  parents’  confidence  and 
interest in public education and encourage them to send their children to public school.
As expected,  religious  beliefs  provide  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  private  school 
enrollment rates at the 1% level, as shown in both columns (1) and (4). This result means that 
religious beliefs may be the parents’ reason for choosing private education, because most private 
schools are funded by religious denominations.
Furthermore, we  test the  correlations. The  Pearson  correlation  coefficients  (as  shown  in 
Table 3) suggest that multicollinearity may exist in the regression model. First, there could be 
collinearity  between  poverty  (measured  by  “public  school  enrollments  from  low  income 
families”) and the racial composition variables in the regression (i.e., proportions of African-
American  enrollments  and  minorities  except  African-American  enrollments).  Second,  there 
could be collinearity between the teacher quality (measures by “average educational level of full-
time  teachers  multiplied  by average  teaching  years”)  and  “average  full-time  teacher  salary”, 
because  both of these variables could represent  teachers’ productivity to some extent. Third, 
there could be collinearity between “student–teacher ratios” and “local taxes per pupil”, since 
both  of  these  two  variables  indicate  the  quality  of  public  schools.  Fourth,  there  could  be 
collinearity between “growth rates of proportion of public high school graduates enrolled in 2- or 
4-year colleges and universities” and “growth rates of SAT scores”, because both of these two 
variables  represent  student  performance.  Therefore,  to  avoid  multicollinearity,  some  of  the 
explanatory variables should be dropped, such as “proportions of African-American enrollments 
and minorities except African-American enrollments”, “average educational level of full-time 
teachers multiplied by average teaching years”, “student–teacher ratios”, and “growth rates of 
SAT  scores”.  Consequently,  as  columns  (3)  and  (6)  of  Table  1  show,  proportion  of  public 
secondary  school  dropouts,  local  taxes  per  pupil,  urbanization,  and  religious  beliefs  exert  a 
positive and significant effect at the 1% level on private school enrollment rates; but proportion 
of low-income families in public schools, average full-time teacher salaries in public schools, 
and growth rates of proportion of public high school graduates enrolled in 2- or 4-year colleges 
and universities provide a negative and significant effect at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels on private 
school enrollment rates.
Determinants of Local Taxes per Student
The results from the 2SLS estimations are presented in Table 2. As columns (1) and (4) 
show, private school enrollment rates exert a positive and significant effect on local taxes per 
student at the 1% level. The positive effect suggests that increases in private school enrollments 
greatly  benefit  tax  support  for  public  schools. The  estimated  coefficient  of  private  school 
enrollment rates is 374.303, which means that one additional percentage point in the private 
school enrollment rate is estimated to increase public school spending from local taxes for each 
student by approximately $374.
In columns (1) and (4), proportion of low-income families in public schools exerts a negative 
and significant effect on local taxes per student at the 1% level. The negative effect implies that a 
greater number of families at the poverty level would slow down the local economy, in turn 
decreasing  local  tax  revenues.  In  addition,  student-teacher  ratio  in  public  schools  exerts  a 
negative and significant effect on local taxes per student at the 1% level, implying that increases 
in the student-teacher ratio cause a great loss in tax support for public schools.
Both  the  proportions  of  African-American  enrollments  and  minority  enrollments  except 
African-American  in public  schools  in columns  (1)  and (4)  reveal a positive and significant 
effect on local taxes per student at the 1% level. According to the positive effect, the greater the6
minority enrollments in public schools, the greater the number of white students from middle-
and  high-income  families  who  may  switch  to  private  schools; thereby  creating  a  significant
benefit in tax support for public schools. Similarly, public secondary school dropout rates exert a 
positive and significant effect on local taxes at the 1% level, meaning that a larger number of
students would withdraw from public schools, which would then lose tax support.
In addition, as shown in columns (1) and (4), urbanization exerts a negative and significant 
effect on local taxes per student at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. A possible explanation for 
the negative effect is that maybe lower performance is correlated with big city schools, causing it 
to be negative.
Moreover,  according to  the  correlation  test,  multicollinearity  may  exist  in  the  regression 
model. Thus, some variables need to be dropped. As shown in columns (3) and (6) of Table 2, 
private school enrollment rates and public secondary school dropout rates exert a positive and 
significant effect on local taxes per student at the 1% level. The estimated coefficient of private 
school enrollment rates is 396.083 in column (3). Therefore, roughly speaking, based on columns 
(1) and (3), a 1% increase in the private school enrollment rate will lead to an increase in public 
school spending of $350 - $400. In addition, both proportion of low-income families in public 
schools and urbanization exert a negative and significant effect on local taxes per student at the 
1% level. However, urbanization in column (6) does not exert a significant effect (although it is 
positive) on local taxes per student.  
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically examine the link between local taxes and parental choice of 
education. Due to the endogenous relationship, Two-Stage Least Squares estimation was used to 
correct  for  simultaneous  equations  bias.  A  total  of  500  school  districts  in  the  state  of 
Pennsylvania were selected for a case study, emphasizing school years 1999-2000 to 2001-2002. 
Empirical results reveal that local taxes per student are positively and significantly related to
private  school enrollment  rates, meaning  that  increases  in private school enrollments greatly
benefit tax support for public schools.
Notes
1. The level of education is measured via codes. These codes are: 1 = less than high school graduate; 2 = high 
school graduate; 3 = less than bachelor’s degree; 4 = bachelor’s degree; 5 = master’s degree; and 6 = doctor’s 
degree (see Public School Professional Personnel, Pennsylvania Department of Education).
2. The real estate tax is levied on the land and buildings owned by individuals and businesses. This tax is the 
major source of tax revenue for most school districts and used by all Pennsylvania districts.
3. The earned income tax is levied on the wages, salaries, commissions, net profits, and other compensation of 
those who reside in the district, but the income from interest and dividends is not included. This tax is the 
largest  of  the  non-property  taxes,  and  applies  to  employed  individuals,  unincorporated  business  owners, 
partnerships, etc., and is normally withheld from workers’ paychecks.
4. Large City = a central city of a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) or Consolidated Statistical Area (CSA), 
with the city having a population greater than or equal to 250,000; Mid-size City = a central city of a CBSA or 
CSA, with the city having a population less than 250,000; Urban Fringe of a Large City = any incorporated 
place, Census designed place, or non-place territory within a CBSA or CSA of a mid-size city and defined as 
urban by the Census Bureau; Urban Fringe of a Mid-size City = any incorporated place, Census designated 
place, or non-place territory within a CBSA or CSA of a mid-size city and defined as urban by the Census 
Bureau; Large Town = an incorporated place or Census designated place with a population greater than or equal 
to 25,000 and located outside a CBSA or CSA; Small Town = an incorporated place or Census designated place 7
with population less than 25,000 and greater than or equal to 2,500 and located outside a CBSA or CSA; Rural, 
outside CBSA = any incorporated place, Census designated place, or non-place territory not within a CBSA or 
CSA of a large or mid-size city and defined as rural by the Census Bureau; and Rural, inside CBSA = any 
incorporated place, Census designated place, or non-place territory within a CBSA or CSA of a large or mid-
size  city  and  defined  as  rural  by  the  Census  Bureau.  (Source:  Pennsylvania  Department  of  Education 
(www.pde.state.pa.us)).
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Table 1: Estimates of PER
Explanatory 
Variables
Model 1 (Equation 1.1): 2SLS
Explained Variable: PER
Model 2 (Equation 1.2): 2SLS
Explained Variable: PER






































































































































2 0.472 0.458 0.450 0.431 0.423 0.415
R
2 0.468 0.454 0.447 0.427 0.419 0.412
F-Statistics 110.91 114.47 174.10 93.95 99.14 150.92
Sample Size 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
(t-value) *** Denote statistical significance of the t-statistic at the 0.01 level; ** denote statistical significance of 
the t-statistic at the 0.05 level; * denote statistical significance of the t-statistic at the 0.10 level.9
Table 2: Estimates of LTX and log (LTX) 
Explanatory 
Variables
Model 1 (Equation 2.1): 2SLS
Explained Variable: LTX
Model 2 (Equation 2.2): 2SLS
Explained Variable: log (LTX)


















































































2 0.965 0.961 0.958 0.898 0.897 0.891
R
2 0.965 0.961 0.958 0.897 0.896 0.890
F-Statistics 5861.80 6175.90 8574.17 1868.56 2158.04 3040.81
Sample Size 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500
(t-value) *** Denote statistical significance of the t-statistic at the 0.01 level; ** denote statistical significance of 
the t-statistic at the 0.05 level; * denote statistical significance of the t-statistic at the 0.10 level.10
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Two Variables (P-Values)
PLI ATS AEY PBS PMS PSD LTX URB GPH GSA
PLI 1.000
(0.000)
-0.358
(0.000)
0.123
(0.000)
0.519
(0.000)
0.053
(0.041)
0.509
(0.000)
-0.61
(0.000)
-0.073
(0.005)
0.025
(0.332)
-0.031
(0.236)
ATS -0.358
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
0.226
(0.000)
0.093
(0.001)
0.187
(0.000)
-0.216
(0.000)
0.630
(0.000)
0.492
(0.000)
-0.016
(0.540)
-0.001
(0.981)
AEY 0.123
(0.000)
0.226
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
-0.175
(0.000)
-0.221
(0.000)
-0.067
(0.009)
-0.203
(0.000)
-0.041
(0.115)
0.004
(0.881)
-0.055
(0.033)
PBS 0.519
(0.000)
0.093
(0.001)
-0.175
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
0.209
(0.000)
0.413
(0.000)
-0.005
(0.860)
0.366
(0.000)
-0.025
(0.326)
-0.008
(0.752)
PMS 0.053
(0.041)
0.187
(0.000)
-0.221
(0.000)
0.209
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
0.261
(0.000)
0.187
(0.000)
0.303
(0.000)
-0.023
(0.368)
-0.001
(0.960)
PSD 0.509
(0.000)
-0.216
(0.000)
-0.067
(0.009)
0.413
(0.000)
0.261
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
-0.303
(0.000)
0.088
(0.001)
0.009
(0.742)
-0.026
(0.322)
LTX -0.61
(0.000)
0.630
(0.000)
-0.203
(0.000)
-0.005
(0.860)
0.187
(0.000)
-0.303
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
0.351
(0.000)
-0.025
(0.332)
0.062
(0.017)
URB -0.073
(0.005)
0.492
(0.000)
-0.041
(0.115)
0.366
(0.000)
0.303
(0.000)
0.088
(0.001)
0.351
(0.000)
1.000
(0.000)
-0.049
(0.057)
0.027
(0.288)
GPH 0.025
(0.332)
-0.016
(0.540)
0.004
(0.881)
-0.025
(0.326)
-0.023
(0.368)
0.009
(0.742)
-0.025
(0.332)
-0.049
(0.057)
1.000
(0.000)
-0.024
(0.348)
GSA -0.031
(0.236)
-0.001
(0.981)
-0.055
(0.033)
-0.008
(0.752)
-0.001
(0.960)
-0.026
(0.322)
0.062
(0.017)
0.027
(0.288)
-0.024
(0.348)
1.000
(0.000)